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In a classic paper, Schelling (1971) showed that extreme segregation can arise from social interactions
in white preferences: once the minority share in a neighborhood exceeds a critical "tipping point,"
all the whites leave. We use regression discontinuity methods and Census tract data from 1970 through
2000 to test for discontinuities in the dynamics of neighborhood racial composition.  White population
flows exhibit tipping-like behavior in most cities, with a distribution of tipping points ranging from
5% to 20% minority share.  The estimated discontinuities are robust to controls for a wide variety
of neighborhood characteristics, and are as strong in the suburbs as in tracts close to high-minority
neighborhoods, ruling out the main alternative explanations for apparent tipping behavior.  In contrast
to white population flows, there is no systematic evidence that rents or housing prices exhibit non-linearities
around the tipping point. Finally, we relate the location of the estimated tipping points in different
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jrothst@princeton.eduSocial interaction models have been used to explain segregation (Schelling, 1971, 1978; 
Becker and Murphy, 2000), collective action (Granovetter, 1978), persistent unemployment 
(Cooper and John, 1988), and crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996).  The key 
feature of these models is that preferences depend on other agents￿ choices, potentially leading to 
multiple equilibria and tipping (Brock and Durlauf, 2001b; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003).  
Researchers have attempted to identify preference spillovers by estimating the effect of peer 
characteristics on individual decisions (e.g. Case and Katz, 1991; Evans, Oates and Schwab, 
1992; Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005)
1; and by testing for excess dispersion in choices across 
social groups (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996; Graham 2005). To date, however, 
there is no direct evidence of the tipping behavior predicted by many social interaction models. 
In this paper we use regression discontinuity methods (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hahn, 
Todd and van de Klaauw, 2001) to test for race-based tipping in neighborhoods.  To illustrate 
our approach, Figure 1 plots mean percentage changes in the white population of Chicago 
Census tracts from 1970 to 1980 against the minority share in 1970.
2  The figure also shows 
predictions from a local linear regression model, estimated with a break at a 5% minority share ￿ 
the level identified by two alternative procedures as the most likely potential tipping point.  The 
graph shows clear evidence of tipping, with white population gains to the left of the tipping point 
and substantial outflows just to the right.  We find similar (though less extreme) patterns for a 
broad sample of U.S. cities in each of the past three decades. 
We begin the paper by outlining a simple model of a local housing market in which 
whites￿ willingness to pay for homes depends on the neighborhood minority share.  Under 
                                                 
1 See Manski (1993) for a discussion of the difficulties in testing for interaction effects, and Glaeser and Scheinkman 
(2003) for a review of many existing studies. 
2 We express the change in white population as a fraction of the total tract population in 1970. Minorities are defined 
as nonwhites and white Hispanics.  
  -2-
certain assumptions, shifts in the relative demand of whites and minorities will lead to smooth 
changes in the minority share of the neighborhood as long as the minority share remains below a 
critical threshold. Beyond this tipping point all the white households will leave.  The location of 
the tipping point is determined in part by the strength of white preferences for minority contact, 
and is higher when whites are more tolerant of minority neighbors.  
We then set out to test for tipping behavior using decadal changes in neighborhood 
racial/ethnic composition.  A major obstacle is that the location of the tipping point is unknown. 
We use two approaches to identify city-specific potential tipping points. First, drawing from the 
literature on structural breaks, we select the point that yields the best fitting model for tract-level 
white population changes.  Second, building on the pattern in Figure 1, we fit a flexible model 
for tract-level changes in white population shares in each city, and find the minority share with a 
predicted change equal to the city-wide average change.  The methods yield very similar tipping 
points for most cities.  The estimated tipping points for a given city are also highly correlated 
across the three decades in our sample.  
As suggested by the pattern in Figure 1, we find large, significant discontinuities in the 
white population growth rate at the identified tipping points.  These are robust to the inclusion of 
flexible controls for other neighborhood characteristics, including poverty, unemployment, and 
housing attributes.  Similar tipping patterns are present in larger and smaller cities in all regions 
of the country, and in both suburban and central city neighborhoods.   
Neither rents nor housing prices exhibit sharp discontinuities at the tipping point.
3   
Nevertheless, tipping has an important effect on the quantity of new housing units, particularly in 
                                                 
3 In an early study, Laurenti (1960) pointed out that there is little theoretical or empirical support for the widespread 
belief that home values necessarily fall when neighborhoods undergo racial transition.   
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tracts with remaining open land where new construction is still possible.  The rates of population 
growth and new construction in these tracts falls markedly once a tract reaches the tipping point. 
We conclude that tipping is a general feature of American cities that has persisted into 
the 1990s.  This contrasts with the conclusions of an earlier study using the same data (Easterly, 
2005), which looked for but did not find evidence of the discontinuous neighborhood change 
predicted by tipping models.  Easterly assumed that the tipping point would be the same in all 
cities.  Our analysis indicates that this assumption is too restrictive.  Failure to allow for 
differences across cities in the location of the tipping point smooths out the discontinuities we 
identify, masking important tipping effects. 
We conclude by examining the determinants of the location of the tipping point in 
different cities.  Consistent with earlier work by Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) on 
preferences and segregation, we find that tipping points are higher in cities with more tolerant 
whites, underscoring the role of white preferences in tipping and the dynamics of segregation.  
Tipping points are also related with racial composition, racial income differences, density, crime 
rates, and measures of past racial tension, all in the expected directions.  They rose slightly over 
the twenty years that we study, but this is more than explained by demographic changes. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
a. A Model of Tipping 
  We present a simple partial equilibrium model of neighborhood composition that treats 
local housing demand functions as primitive.
4  Consider a neighborhood with a homogenous 
                                                 
4 The literature contains many models of neighborhood choice that yield tipping behavior, including Schelling (1971,  
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housing stock of measure one and two groups of potential buyers: whites (w) and minorities (m). 
 Let b
g(n
g, m) (g∈{w, m}) denote the inverse demand (or bid-rent) functions of the two groups 
for homes in the neighborhood when it has minority share m, so that there are n
g families from 
group g who are willing to pay at least b
g(n





m are (weakly) negative.  The derivatives ∂b
w/∂m and ∂b
w/∂m represent 
social interaction effects on the bid-rent functions.  We assume that for minority shares beyond 




  At an integrated equilibrium with minority share m ∈ (0, 1), the m
th highest minority 
bidder has the same willingness to pay as the (1-m)
th highest white bidder.  That is,  
(1) b
m(m, m) = b
w(1−m, m).
6 
The derivative of the white bid function b




w/∂m.  The first term in this expression is positive.  If the social 
interaction effect ∂b
w/∂m is small at m=0 but becomes more negative as m rises, b
w(1−m, m) will 
have the shape illustrated in Figure 2 ￿ positively sloped at m=0, but eventually downward-
sloping.  We assume for illustrative purposes that b
m(m,m) is downward-sloping and linear.
7 
  In the neighborhood illustrated in Figure 2, there are three equilibria, one all-minority 
and two mixed.  Point A is a locally stable mixed equilibrium. Just to the right of this point, the 
marginal white family has a higher willingness to pay than the marginal minority family, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1978), Miyao (1979), and Bond and Coulson (1989).  Ours is derived from Becker and Murphy (2000).   
5 Survey evidence suggests that whites prefer a neighborhood with minority share around 10%, and strongly avoid 
neighborhoods where m>25%.  See e.g., Clark (1991) and Farley et al. (1993).  Note, however, that unless all whites 
have similar preferences, the market-level demand function need not reflect any single person￿s preferences. 
6 Depending on the shapes of the inverse demand functions, this equation may have multiple solutions.  There may 
also be corner solutions, all-white when b
w(1, 0) ≥ b
m(1, 0) and all-minority when b
w(0, 1) ≤ b
m(1, 1).   
7 The derivative of the minority bid function b
m(m, m) with respect to m is ∂b
m/∂n
w + ∂b
m/∂m.  This could be 
positive for low m if minorities strongly dislike all-white neighborhoods.  
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transactions will occur to return the system to A.  (A parallel argument applies just to the left of 
A).  The other mixed equilibrium, B, is unstable: a positive shock to the minority share here 
would reduce the marginal white family￿s bid by more than that of the marginal minority family, 
and the neighborhood would trend toward the all-minority equilibrium, C.
8 
Now consider an all-white neighborhood that experiences rising relative demand by 
minorities, driven by growth in the population or relative income of minorities in a city.
9  Figure 
3 shows a series of equilibria for the neighborhood, assuming the demand functions have the 
shapes illustrated in Figure 2.  At low levels of minority demand, m=0 is a stable equilibrium.  
As b
m shifts upward, prices begin to rise and a few minority families displace whites with the 
lowest willingness to pay.  The neighborhood will then be in a stable mixed equilibrium.  Further 
increases in the relative demand of minorities will cause the minority share at the stable 
equilibrium to rise gradually until b
m is just tangent to b
w.   
The minority share at the tangency, m
*, is a ￿tipping point￿: once m reaches this level, 
any further increase in minority demand causes the integrated equilibria to disappear, leaving 
only the 100% minority equilibrium.
10  The neighborhood￿s minority share will then move 
toward m=1.  Once this process begins, even a downward shift in the minority demand function 
that restores the integrated equilibria will typically not reverse the tipping process, as m will 
continue converging toward m=1 so long as it lies to the right of the unstable equilibrium. 
                                                 
8 A standard result is that the number of equilibria, e, must be odd, and that (e-1)/2 of these must be unstable. 
9 Most U.S. metropolitan areas have seen rising minority shares in recent decades.  An alternative is to assume that 
houses become relatively less attractive to white buyers as they age, leading to a relative decline in the white bid 
function over time.  This is similar to the filtering model proposed by Bond and Coulson (1989).   
10 An unstable equilibrium (e.g.,  point B in Figure 2) is often characterized as a tipping point.  Our definition of a 
tipping point as a so-called ￿bifurcation￿ has several advantages over this.  Most importantly, it provides a simple 
explanation for the presence of neighborhoods just to the left of the tipping point.  Tipping occurs in only one 
direction from m
*, whereas an unstable equilibrium is unstable in both directions.  
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 The  location of the tipping point m
* depends on the strength of white distaste for 
minority neighbors (i.e., on ∂b
w/∂m).  If, for example, white demand for a neighborhood falls off 
sharply once the minority share exceeds 5%, the tipping point will not be much above this level. 
 More tolerant whites will lead to a higher tipping point.
11   
In this model, the rental price of housing evolves smoothly through the tipping point, 
despite the discontinuity in white outflows.  Rents at the long-run m=1 equilibrium can be higher 
or lower than at the tipping point, depending on the shape of the minority bid-rent function (and 
on shifts in minority demand once tipping is underway).  As house prices depend on expected 
future rents, price changes as m passes though m
* depend on expectations about the future 
evolution of the neighborhood.  A useful extension of the model ￿ particularly given the results 
on neighborhood population growth presented below ￿ would incorporate housing supply, which 
may also depend on expected future rents.  Careful modeling of expectations is complex and 
beyond the scope of this paper.
12  We merely note that prices and rates of new construction may, 
but need not, change discontinuously when a neighborhood tips. 
b. Empirical Implications 
  In Figure 3 we assumed steady increases in relative minority demand.  On average this is 
likely to be true, since minority populations have risen in most U.S. cities over the past 50 years. 
Even so, there are also likely to be neighborhood-specific shifts in relative demand (i.e. in 
b
m(m,m) ￿ b
w(1−m, m)).  Under standard assumptions on b
w and b
m, small shifts in relative 
demand will produce small changes in the location of the integrated equilibrium, so long as it 
                                                 
11 For fixed white demand, the tipping point will be lower the stronger are minority tastes for higher m. 
12 Merton (1948) provides an early discussion of the role of ￿self-fulfilling prophecies￿ in neighborhood change.  
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remains below m
*, and the neighborhood will move smoothly toward the new equilibrium.
13  For 
a neighborhood with an initial minority share mt−1 somewhat less than m
*, the expected change 
in the minority share is therefore a smooth function of mt−1.  Formally, if mt−1 ∈ [0, m
*−r), where 
r represents the maximum (scaled) relative demand shock between t−1 and t, E[Δmt | mt−1]  =  
g(mt−1) for some continuous function g.  By contrast, the expected change for tracts that have 
begun tipping is positive: E[Δmt | mt−1]   =   h(mt−1) > 0 for mt−1 > m
*.  The intermediate range is 
a grey area￿tracts with initial minority shares in [m
*−r, m
*] will tip if they experience 
sufficiently large shocks, but not otherwise.  Assuming this range is small:  
(2)    E[Δmt | mt−1]  ≈   1(mt−1< m
*)g(mt−1)  +  1(mt−1  ≥ m
*) h(mt−1).  
If  limε→0+  h(m
*+ε)−g(m
*−ε) > 0, the right hand side of this expression is discontinuous at m
*.  
Given the nature of g and h, we expect the jump to be large.  We therefore test for tipping by 
testing for a discontinuity in E[Δmt | mt−1] at candidate values of m
*.  Note that the derivation of 
(2) suggests the function E[Δmt | mt−1] may not be strictly discontinuous at m
* but only steeply 
sloped in the [m
*￿r, m
*] range.
14  We interpret such a pattern as evidence of tipping. 
c. Empirical Specification 
  Our empirical analysis uses Census tracts as neighborhoods, and measures changes in 
their composition over the 10 year intervals between Censuses.  While the model presented 
above assumes a fixed supply of housing in each neighborhood, most tracts in our sample 
experience significant growth in their housing stocks and populations.  To allow for shifts in the 
population of a tract, we model changes in the numbers of white and minority residents in the 
                                                 
13 The required condition is that [ db
w(1-m, m)/ dm − db
m(m, m)/ dm ]
−1 is continuous.  This will hold (everywhere 
below the tipping point) if the two bid functions are continuous and concave. 
14 Any heterogeneity in the location of the tipping point across a city￿s neighborhoods or imperfect alignment 
between actual neighborhood boundaries and those that we use for measurement of m will lead us to smooth away 
true discontinuities and will produce a similar pattern of a steep slope in a range around m
*.  
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tract, each expressed as a fraction of the base-period population.   Specifically, let Wic,t, Mic,t, and 
Pic,t (=Wic,t+Mic,t) represent the numbers of whites, minorities, and total residents of Census tract 
i in city c in year t (=1980, 1990, 2000).  Our main dependent variable is the ten-year change in 
the neighborhood￿s white population, taken as a share of the initial population, Dwic,t = (Wic,t − 
Wic,t−10) / Pic,t−10. We also examine analogous measures for minorities and the total population, 
Dmic,t  and Dpic,t = Dwic,t + Dmic,t, respectively.  Our key explanatory variable is the base-year 
minority share in the tract, mic,t−10 = Mic,t−10/Pic,t−10. 
  Equation (2) asserts that E[Dwic,t | mic,t−10 ]  is a smooth function of mit−10, except perhaps 
at the tipping point m
*.  We assume that a tipping point (if it exists) is specific to a given city and 
decade, and we define δic,t−10 = mic,t−10 ￿ m
*
c,t−10.  Our basic empirical specification is:  
(3) Dwic,,t =  p(δic,t−10) + d 1[δic,t−10 > 0]  +  τc   +  Xic,t−10β  + εic,t,  
where τc represents a city fixed effect, Xic,t−10 is a vector of tract-level control variables, and 
p(δic,t−10) is a smooth control function, which we model as a 4
th-order polynomial.
15  We estimate 
(3) separately by decade.  In some specifications we also allow the discontinuity d and the 
parameters of the p( ) function to vary across cities. 
d. Identification of the Tipping Point 
  A key problem in estimating a model like (3) is that the discontinuity point m
*
c,t−10 must 
be estimated from the data.  We assume for the moment that a tipping point exists (i.e. d ≠ 0), 
and focus on estimating its location.  We discuss the possibility that d=0 in the next subsection. 
  We use two methods to obtain candidate values of m
*
c,t−10.  The first is a search technique 
similar to that used to identify structural breaks in time series data.  Ignoring covariates and 
                                                 
15 While p() should in principle be allowed to have discontinuous derivatives at 0, to allow (for example) h￿(m
*) ≠ 
g￿(m
*), our explorations with such models indicate that this flexibility is unnecessary.    
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approximating p() by a constant function in the [0, M] range, equation (3) becomes: 
(4) Dwic,t =  ac  +  dc 1[mic,t-10 > m
*
c,t-10] + εic,t ,        for 0≤mic,t−10≤M, 
We set M=60% and select the value of m
*
c,t-10 in the [0, 50%] interval that maximizes the R
2 of 
(4), separately for each city and decade.  Hansen (2000) shows that if (4) is correctly specified 




  This procedure works well for larger cities but performs poorly in a few smaller cities, 
sometimes choosing a value for m
* that reflects obvious outliers.  Our second, preferred 
approach builds on the consistent shape of smoothed approximations to E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10 ] for 
many different cities.
17  Typically, this function is positive but relatively flat for low values of 
mt−10, then declines sharply.  Beyond the range of transition, E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10 ] is again 
relatively flat until, at a minority share of about 60%, it begins to trend upward, approaching 0 as 
mic,t−10 →1.
18  Interpreting the sharp decline as tipping behavior, this pattern implies that tracts 
with minority shares below the tipping point experience faster-than-average growth in white 
population, whereas those above it experience a relative decline.  If there is a tipping point at m
*, 
then:  
(5) E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10= m
* ￿ ε]  >  E[Dwic,t | c]  >  E[Dwic,t | c, mc,t−10= m
* + ε]    for ε > 0. 
The city-specific tipping point is a ￿fixed point￿: the minority share at which the white 
population of the tract grows at the average rate for the city.  To identify this fixed point, we 
smooth the data to obtain a continuous approximation, R(mt−10), to E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10] ￿ E[Dwic,t 
                                                 
16 Loader (1996) shows that the location of change points can be estimated non-parametrically using local linear 
regression methods.  These methods would be appropriate for the largest cities in our sample. 
17 Many cities experience rising minority shares over our sample period. To abstract from city-wide trends, we focus 
on E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10 ] ￿ E[Dwic,t | c], which equals zero when tracts are evolving in step with the city as a whole. 
18 Dwic,t can never be lower than mic,t−10 ￿ 100, corresponding to total loss of the t−10 white population by year t.  
Many neighborhoods with m ic,t−10 above 60% approach this limit.  
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| c], then select the root of this function.
19  We refer to this as our ￿fixed-point￿ procedure.
20  
d. Hypothesis Testing 
  If our functional form assumptions are correct, both procedures will yield consistent 
estimates of the location of any true discontinuity.  A standard result in the structural break 
literature (see, e.g., Bai, 1997) is that sampling error in the location of a change point (m
*) can be 
ignored in estimation of the magnitude of the break (d).  We rely on this result, and do not adjust 
our standard errors for the estimation of m
*.
21 
Under the null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity, however, the estimate of d has a 
non-standard distribution.  The problem is essentially one of specification search bias (Leamer, 
1978):  When the same data are used to identify the location of structural break and to estimate 
its magnitude, conventional test statistics will reject the null hypothesis d=0 too often.  The usual 
solution (Hansen, 2000; Andrews, 1993) is to simulate the distribution of d ￿  under the null, then 
compare the estimate to this distribution.  We use a different approach that permits conventional 
tests.  We use a randomly selected subset of our sample for our search procedures and use the 
remaining subsample for all further analyses.  Because the two subsamples are independent, 
                                                 
19 We use a two-step procedure to improve precision.  We first fit Dwic,t - E[Dwic,t | c] to a quartic polynomial in 
mic,t−10, using only tracts with mic,t−10 < 60%, to obtain R(mt−10).  After identifying a root of this polynomial, m￿, we 
discard all tracts with abs(mic,t-10 ￿ m￿) > 10 and fit a second quartic polynomial to the remaining tracts.  Our 
candidate point, m
*, is a root of this second polynomial.  We consider only minority shares below 50% as candidate 
points.  When there are multiple roots in this range, we select the one at which the slope of R(m) is smallest (most 
negative).  In a few cities, R(m) has no roots below 50%.  These cities are excluded from the fixed-point analysis.  
The Data Appendix discusses the details of the algorithm in greater detail.   
20 We also explored a third procedure, selecting values for which a smoothed approximation to E[Dw | c, m] is most 
negatively sloped.  Though this procedure agreed with the other two in many cities, in others it was poorly behaved. 
21 Appendix C presents bootstrap standard errors for our primary specification.  Our most conservative approach 
(which re-samples both cities and tracts within cities) yields slightly larger standard errors than those reported in 
Table 3, but the differences are not large enough to qualitatively affect the interpretation of the estimates.   Appendix 
B presents a falsification exercise, in which we apply our methods to data generated by a continuous process.  This 
indicates that the size of our tests is reasonable, around 6%.  
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estimates of d ￿  from the second sample have a standard distribution, even under the null.
 22  
e. Testing other implications of the tipping model 
The model in Section II predicts that rents will evolve smoothly through any tipping 
point, though it has no clear prediction for housing prices.  To explore tipping effects on rents 
and prices, we estimate models similar to (3), but with the change in average rents or in the 
average value of owner-occupied homes as the dependent variable.  We also explore the 
prediction that the tipping point will be higher in cities where whites are more tolerant of 
minority neighbors by relating the estimated tipping point for a city to survey-based measures of 
the racial tolerance of the city￿s white population, controlling for many other city characteristics.  
 
III. Data and Potential Tipping Points 
a. Tract Level Data 
  Our primary data source is the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), a panel of 
census tracts matched from 1970 to 2000.  Tracts are areas of about 4,000 people, drawn to 
represent demographically homogenous neighborhoods.  The NCDB provides population counts 
and other tabulations from each Census year for each year-2000 census tract, mapping the earlier 
data onto the current boundaries.
23  We do not exploit the full panel structure of the NCDB, but 
focus only on changes over three ten-year inter-censal windows: 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 1990, 
and 1990 to 2000.  In 1970, tract-level data were collected only for the central areas of many 
                                                 
22 Angrist, Imbens, and Krueger (1999) propose a split sample approach for IV estimation with weak instruments.  
Estimates based on the full sample show somewhat larger, more precisely estimated discontinuities than our split-
sample estimates. 
23 Ideally, we would hold tracts fixed at their initial boundaries, as later boundaries may be endogenous.  We were 
able to construct our own panel of tracts for our 1990-2000 analyses using 1990 boundaries. Results on this panel 
were very similar to those from the NCDB data, and were unchanged by dropping tracts with boundary changes.  
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MSAs, so our analysis for the 1970-80 period is based largely on central city neighborhoods.  
We are able to include more suburban areas in analyses of the 1980s and 1990s.  We exclude 
from each ten-year sample tracts that were largely undeveloped (had very few residents) in the 
base year. 
Our ￿cities￿ are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and primary metropolitan 
statistical areas (PMSAs), as defined in 1999.  We exclude cities with fewer than 100 sample 
tracts, effectively limiting our analysis to larger metropolitan areas.  The Data Appendix 
describes our sample selection procedures in detail.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the tract-level data.  The NCDB has 1970 data on 
about 46,000 tracts, increasing to 65,000 in 1990.  After dropping undeveloped tracts, those that 
cannot be matched over time, and all tracts from smaller cities, our sample includes roughly 
40,000 tracts from 114 metropolitan areas.  The white populations of the cities in our sample 
have grown over time, but because minority (i.e., non-white and Hispanic) populations have 
grown faster, the average minority share has risen steadily, from 16% in 1970 to 29% in 1990.   
The remainder of Table 1 compares four subgroups of tracts, defined by the fraction of 
minority residents in the base year.   In 1970, nearly one-half of tracts in our sample had 
minority shares below 5%.  By 1990, only a quarter had such a low minority share.  This decline 
was offset by growth in the 20-40% minority group (which rose from 10% to 35% of all tracts) 
and the 40% or higher group (which rose from 13% to 27%).  The growth rate of the white 
population is strikingly different across subgroups, averaging +19% in the two lower-minority-
share groups and negative or close to zero in the higher-minority-share groups.  
b. Estimated Tipping Points  
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  Figure 4 presents data similar to that in Figure 1 for a selection of cities in our sample.  
The vertical lines in each panel represent the estimated tipping points ￿ solid for the point 
selected by the ￿fixed point￿ method and dashed for the point selected by the ￿structural break￿ 
method.  (Where only one line is shown, the two coincide.)  Both points are identified from a 
randomly-selected 2/3 subsample of tracts in each city.
24  We also plot two approximations to 
E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10 ], computed on the remaining 1/3 subsample of tracts.  The dots represent the 
means of Dwic,t among all tracts with mic,t−10 in each 2-percentage-point bin.  The solid lines 
represent a local linear regression fit to the underlying data, allowing a break at the estimate of 
m
* from the fixed point method.  Finally, the horizontal line in each figure shows the city-wide 
average change in the white population share, E[Dwic,t | c]. 
  The upper left panel shows Los Angeles in 1970-80.  Both search procedures identify a 
potential tipping point at a 1970 minority share of around 15%.  Tracts with mi,1970 < 15% gained 
white residents between 1970 and 1980, on average, while those with mi,1970 > 15% lost 
substantial numbers of whites.  There is a clear separation between the two groups: the average 
in every bin in the first group lies above E[Dwic,1980 | c], while the average for bins in the second 
group (excepting a few with minority shares close to 100%) lie below. 
  The remaining panels of Figure 4 show seven other cities: Indianapolis and Portland 
(Oregon) in 1970-1980, San Antonio and Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon (New Jersey) in 1980-
1990, Nashville and Toledo in 1990-2000, and Pittsburgh in 1980-1990.  These cities are drawn 
from all regions of the country, and vary widely in their overall minority shares.  In each city, 
our two search methods yield similar candidate tipping points.  In all but the last example, there 
                                                 
24 We use a 2/3 ￿ 1/3 split because the search procedures for identifying tipping points in each city are quite data 
intensive.  Most of the remainder of our analysis pools data across cities, and 1/3 subsamples are adequate for this.  
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is clear evidence of a discontinuity around the candidate tipping points.   The exception is 
Pittsburgh in the 1980s, which shows a smoother V-shaped relationship between the white 
population growth rate and the initial minority share. 
  Table 2 summarizes the estimated tipping points for all the cities in our sample. The fixed 
point method tends to identify higher tipping points than the structural break method, though 
both methods show an upward trend over time.
25  This increase accords with the predictions of 
our model and evidence from public opinion surveys that whites have become more tolerant of 
minorities (Schuman et al., 1998).  The lower portion of the Table shows the correlations of the 
candidate tipping points for a city identified by the alternative methods in a given year, or over 
time.  These correlations are all reasonably high.  The two methods select candidate tipping 
points within 1 percentage point of each other in about 1/3 of cities. 
   
IV. Pooled Analysis of White Population Changes  
a. Graphical Overview 
  We now turn to pooled specifications that combine the data from all of the cities in our 
sample.  The six panels in Figure 5 show the relationship between the base year minority share in 
a Census tract, deviated from the city-specific potential tipping point, and the subsequent change 
in the white share in the tract, deviated from the city-wide mean.  We use candidate tipping 
points from the fixed point method on the left and from the structural break method on the right, 
with 1970-80 data at the top, 1980-90 data in the middle, and 1990-2000 data in the lower 
panels. The dots in each figure represent mean changes for 1-percentage-point bins of δic = mic ￿ 
                                                 
25 The fixed point method fails to find a tipping point in 4 cities in 1970 and 3 cities in 1980.  By construction, the 




c, while the solid lines show local linear regressions fit to the data on each side of the 
candidate point.  Finally, the dashed lines show fitted values from a 4
th-order polynomial in δic, 
allowing an intercept shift at δic = 0.  We limit attention to δic ∈ [-30, 30].  Note that relatively 
few cities are represented in the lower range of this interval, since most cities have m
*
c < 20. 
The 1970-80 and 1980-1990 data show very clear evidence that the pattern seen in Figure 
4 is a general phenomenon.  We see a 15 percentage point drop in the mean change in the white 
population share when we compare tracts just below and just above the tipping point.  In 1990-
2000, the discontinuity is still evident but is somewhat less sharply defined, as a few tracts near 
the tipping point smooth away some of the difference between the trends on either side.  Overall, 
however, we believe the plots provide strong evidence of tipping behaviour.  In each year, using 
either set of candidate tipping points, tracts just beyond the tipping point experience substantial 
relative outflows of white families.   
b. RD Models 
The results in Figure 5 are visually striking but do not permit formal hypothesis tests nor 
control for other neighborhood characteristics that may affect white mobility.  Table 3 presents 
decade-specific estimates of equation (3), fit to the subsample of tracts from each city not used to 
identify m
*.  All the models in the table include city fixed effects and a quartic polynomial in the 
deviation of the tract minority share from the city-specific tipping point.
26  The models in 
columns 1 and 2 ￿ based on candidate tipping points from the two alternative procedures ￿ also 
include controls for six tract-level characteristics in the base year: the unemployment rate, the 
                                                 
26 The standard errors in Table 3 (and in all remaining tables) are clustered by city.  We have also estimated models 
with several alternative specifications for p( ), including quadratics with separate first and second order coefficients 
on each side of the candidate tipping point.  The estimated discontinuities are very similar from these alternatives.    
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log of mean family income, the fractions of single-unit, vacant, and renter-occupied housing 
units in the tract, and the fraction of workers who use public transport to travel to work.
27   
  The estimated coefficients for the models in columns 1 and 2 confirm that the growth rate 
of the white population share is discontinuous in the initial minority share around the candidate 
tipping points. When we use the points from the fixed point procedure (column 1), we obtain 
precisely estimated, statistically significant discontinuities of -12, -14, and -7 percentage points 
for the 1970-1980, 1980-1990, and 1990-2000 periods, respectively.  Specifications that use the 
￿structural break￿ tipping points (column 2) are comparable, though marginally less precise.   
  A potential concern with these models is that we have constrained the polynomial p(δ) 
and discontinuity coefficient d to be the same for all cities in a given decade.  The specifications 
in columns 3 and 4 relax these assumptions by including city-specific quartic polynomials and 
discontinuities (but excluding the tract-level covariates).  We report the average discontinuities 
across cities, weighting each city by the number of tracts it provides to the sample.  We continue 
to see relatively large, statistically significant average discontinuities in all but one case (1990-
2000 with fixed point estimates of m
*). 
  Columns 5-8 of Table 3 present models for the growth rates in the neighborhood minority 
population and total population, each measured as a percentage of the total base-year population. 
 The specifications are otherwise identical to those in columns 1 and 2.  The models in columns 5 
and 6 show a relatively small upward jump in minority inflows at the city-specific tipping 
point.
28   As shown by the models in the last two columns, the outflow of whites at the tipping 
                                                 
27 The final variable is motivated by Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport￿s (2000) observation that the poor are 
differentially attracted to neighborhoods with better access to public transportation. 
28 The proportional changes in the minority population approach those for whites, since around a 15% tipping point 
the base minority population is about 1/6 as large as the base white population.     
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point coincides with a discontinuous drop in the growth rate of the tract￿s population (relative to 
the city as a whole).      
  Across specifications in Table 3, the estimated discontinuities around the candidate 
tipping points derived from the ￿fixed-point￿ and ￿structural break￿ procedures are close in 
magnitude and precision.  For the sake of parsimony, in the remainder of our analysis we present 
results based on the tipping points derived from the ￿fixed-point￿ procedure. 
c. Full Tracts versus Tracts with Open Space 
The results in Table 3 show that tipping is associated with a discontinuous drop in overall 
population growth, with little change in minority inflows.  A similar pattern is evident in Table 
1:  on average, tracts with initial minority shares below 20% experienced substantial population 
growth over the next ten years, while those with higher initial shares did not.  These observations 
underscore an important factor that is missing from our model, housing supply.  In additional 
(unreported) analyses, we have fit separate models for new housing construction and for housing 
de-accessions.  These models show a large discontinuity ￿ comparable to the estimates in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 ￿ in the rate of new construction once a tract exceeds the tipping 
point, but no discontinuity in the disappearance of existing units. 
The model in Section II assumes a fixed housing stock, so any decline in white demand is 
mechanically offset by minority inflows.  To approximate a fixed-supply environment, we 
isolate a set of tracts where new housing construction is constrained by a shortage of remaining 
open land.  Specifically, we use data derived from satellite images to estimate the fraction of 
undeveloped land in each Census tract in 1992.
29  We define a tract￿s open space as the fraction 
                                                 
29 The data come from the National Land Cover Data, produced by a consortium of federal agencies from satellite  
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of the developable land area (excluding permanent ice, rocks, quarries, and water) that is not 
currently covered by residential, commercial, industrial, or transportation uses.  We then split 
tracts into two groups: those in the lowest quartile of open space (9% or less) in 1992; and the 
other three quartiles.  Because comparable land use data are unavailable for earlier years, our 
analysis here is restricted to changes between 1990 and 2000. 
Table 4 presents estimates of our baseline specification fit separately for the two groups 
of tracts.  For reference, the first row of the table repeats the corresponding estimates for the full 
sample from Table 3.  The second row presents models for the most intensively developed 
quartile of tracts.  The estimated discontinuity in the white population growth rate is -4.7%.  This 
is somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimate from the full sample, but is still highly 
significant.  Columns 2 and 3 report corresponding estimates for the growth in minority and total 
populations.  In these highly developed tracts, where housing supply is plausibly constrained, the 
discontinuity in minority population growth is equal and opposite to the jump in white 
population growth, with no discontinuity in total tract population.  Thus, in supply-constrained 
tracts, mobility patterns closely match the predictions from a model with fixed housing supply.  
The estimates are quite different in the tracts with substantial undeveloped land.  We 
continue to find a discontinuous change (-6.1%) in the white population growth rate at the 
tipping point for these tracts.   As in the overall sample, however, the loss in white population is 
met by a combination of increased minority inflows and slower population growth, with the 
latter accounting for most of the total response.   
Column 4 of the table presents estimates where the dependent variable is the change in 
                                                                                                                                                             
photos taken in and around 1992.  Algorithms were developed to permit largely automated coding of land uses from 
these photos.  See Vogelmann et al. (2001).  We are extremely grateful to Albert Saiz and Susan Wachter for 
providing to us a version of these data, used in Saiz and Wachter (2006), coded to the census tract.    
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the tract￿s minority share, mic,t ￿ mic,t-10.  The estimated tipping effect on this variable ￿ the 
traditional focus of tipping models ￿ is apparent in all three rows but is largest in the tracts with 
constrained supply, where the denominator of the minority share is essentially fixed.  In 
unconstrained tracts, there are competing changes in the numerator and denominator around the 
tipping point, leading to a relatively small discontinuity in the minority share. 
It appears that in neighborhoods with available land and minority shares below the 
tipping point, new housing is being built that is primarily occupied by whites.  In neighborhoods 
that have tipped, however, inflows of white families fall off and new construction ceases.  We 
return to these results below, in our discussion of the housing market effects of tipping. 
d. Minority Definition 
So far we have defined minorities as all non-whites plus white Hispanics.  Table 5 
presents a series of models in which we vary the definition of ￿minority.￿  We explore 
alternatives that count only blacks, or only blacks and Hispanics, as minorities.   We also present 
a composite model that includes indicators for being beyond the tipping points based on all three 
definitions.
30  Our dependent variable in each specification is the change in the white, non-
Hispanic population, as in earlier tables. 
The data offer no clear guidance about which definition to use.  In the 1970s, tipping 
behavior seems to have been driven more by the black share than by the presence of other 
groups. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, estimates are similar across all three definitions.  In 
the composite models, in columns 3, 6, and 9, none of the measures consistently dominates, 
though the black plus Hispanic measure has the smallest point estimate.  In the remainder of the 
                                                 
30 Each model includes a quartic polynomial in the deviation of the tract￿s minority share, using the same definition 
as is used to define the tipping point.  The composite model includes all three quartics.  Candidate tipping points are 
estimated separately for each definition of minorities, using the fixed point procedure discussed above.  
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paper we use our original measure that counts all non-whites and Hispanics as minorities. 
e. Alternative Models and Additional Specifications 
One concern with our models so far is that the apparently discontinuous relationship 
between white mobility flows and the initial minority share may be due to omitted neighborhood 
characteristics that happen to be discontinuously related to the minority share. Our main 
specifications include a vector of neighborhood demographic and housing characteristics, but 
these linear controls may not be sufficiently flexible to absorb their effects.  To assess this 
possibility, in Table 6 we present a series of extended specifications that add quartic polynomials 
in these variables. Our estimates are robust to the inclusion of these polynomials, suggesting that 
omitted variables of this sort are unlikely to account for our results.     
Another possible explanation for apparent tipping behavior is suburbanization and white 
exodus from the central city, driven by changing preferences of whites and/or an expansion in 
the traditional minority ghetto areas of the inner city.
31   Consider first the hypothesis that white 
families have developed an increasing preference for lower density neighborhoods.  If integrated 
tracts are systematically more ￿urban￿ than nearly all-white tracts, and the latter are mainly 
concentrated in the suburbs, one might observe a discontinuous relationship between white 
population changes and the initial minority share, even though whites do not care about the 
minority share of a neighborhood.  A similar but distinct explanation invokes politics:  white 
families may have fled central city neighborhoods to avoid living in majority-black cities 
(Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport 2000).  Either channel predicts that tipping effects should be 
concentrated in central city tracts.   
                                                 
31 There is a large literature examining the rapid suburbanization of the post-war era.  See, for example, Baum-Snow 
(2007), Boustan (2006), Mieszkowski and Mills (1993), and Margo (1992).  Bajari and Kahn (2005) consider the 
role of racial preferences and other explanations in explaining suburbanization.  
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To evaluate these alternative explanations we extend our baseline model to allow 
different discontinuities (and different city fixed effects, polynomials p(δ), and control variable 
coefficients) for tracts within and outside the central city.  We find (columns 1-3 of Table 7) no 
systematic differences in the magnitude of the tipping discontinuity between central-city and 
suburban tracts.  For all three decades of our sample the estimated discontinuities in the white 
population growth rate are negative and statistically significant for both central city and non-
central city tracts, and in the 1980s and 1990s the discontinuity is larger for the latter group.
32 
Another explanation for apparent tipping behavior is an expanding ghetto (Mobius and 
Rosenblat, 2002).  Specifically, consider a circular city with a minority ghetto at the center, 
surrounded by a ring of integrated neighborhoods and an outer ring of nearly all-white suburbs.  
As the minority population of the city grows, the ghetto expands and the integrated ring moves 
outward.  Outer tracts remain predominantly white, but integrated tracts near the boundary of the 
ghetto experience significant white flight.
33  Such a process could yield tipping-like patterns. 
Several different analyses suggest that an expanding ghetto cannot account for the tipping 
behavior we have documented, however.  First, contrary to the pattern predicted by an expanding 
ghetto, tracts with minority shares near the tipping point tend to be relatively far from the 
existing urban ghetto, and show no tendency to be farther away in later decades.  Tracts with 
minority shares near the city-specific tipping point lie at an average distance of 13 miles from the 
center of the historical ghetto (defined using 1970 data) in each decade of our sample.
34   
Second, tipping is not confined to tracts that are close to existing high minority areas.  
                                                 
32 We have also fit a model that allows different tipping effects in tracts with high and low rates of public transport 
usage.  We found no systematic differences along this dimension either. 
33 Downs (1960, p. 187) argued that ￿almost all nonwhite expansion occurs on the borders of large ghettos.￿ 
34 This statistic is based on tracts with mic,t-10 within two percentage points of m
*
c,t-10.  The center of the ghetto is 
defined as the tract in the MSA with the highest minority fraction in 1970.  Other definitions yield similar results.  
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The models in columns 4-6 of Table 7 are fully interacted with indicators for tracts that are 2-5 
miles from any other tract with at least a 60% minority share in the base year, or over 5 miles 
away from any such tracts.  In the 1970-80 and 1980-90 models, the magnitude of the tipping 
effect is larger for the tracts that are farthest from a high-minority tract than for those within two 
miles of one.  In 1990-2000, the estimated discontinuities are very similar for all three groups of 
tracts. 
The specifications in columns 7-9 use a different measure of proximity, based on the 
presence of at least one neighboring tract with a minority share above the tipping point.  We 
fully interact our model with an indicator for having no such tracts nearby.  The estimation 
results suggest that during the 1970s and 1980s, tipping was concentrated in tracts with no 
neighbors that had tipped.  This is the opposite of the prediction of the expanding ghetto model, 
leading us to conclude that such a model cannot account for the non-linear dynamics we see in 
Figures 4 and 5.  Tipping effects are if anything strongest far from the existing ghetto.  
Finally, we have experimented with more flexible models that include controls for the 
average minority share of nearby tracts and that allow the tipping effect to vary with the fraction 
of neighboring tracts that are themselves beyond the tipping point.  Consistent with the results in 
columns 7-9 of Table 7, these specifications suggest that the tipping effect is relatively large for 
tracts with no neighboring tracts that have tipped, and much smaller when the neighbors all have 
high minority shares.  They also show clear spillover effects.  White population inflows are 
strongly decreasing in the fraction of nearby tracts with m>m
*.  Our interpretation of these 
extended models is that the ￿own tract￿ minority share is an imperfect measure of the minority 
share variable driving neighborhood choice.  If, for example, residents near the boundary of a  
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tract see their neighborhood as including homes in neighboring tracts, we would expect to see 
significant spillover effects.  The ￿own-tract￿ tipping indicator would then be an unreliable 
measure of whether the relevant area has a minority share above the tipping point, with 
particularly little signal when neighboring tracts have high minority shares. 
 
V.  Housing Markets 
The model presented in Section II predicts that rents will evolve relatively smoothly as a 
neighborhood exceeds the tipping point, despite a discontinuity in the racial composition of the 
neighborhood.  As we noted earlier, implications for home values are less clear, since the price 
of an asset like housing will be sensitive to long-term expectations about future rents and prices.  
Figure 6 presents graphs of the relationship between δic,t−10 (the deviation of the minority 
share in a tract from the appropriate tipping point) and the intercensal changes in the log of 
average monthly rent paid by renters in the tract and the log of average housing values reported 
by homeowners in the tract.
35   As in Figure 5, we show dots representing means for percentage-
point bins of δic,t−10 in the interval [-30,30], as well as fitted values from our fourth-order 
polynomial model (dashed lines) and the predictions from local linear regression models (solid 
lines).  Looking first at the pattern for rents (on the left) there is no indication of substantial falls 
as the minority share in a tract moves from below the tipping point to well above it.  Indeed, the 
estimated discontinuities in the change in rents are small (-1.5% in 1970-80 and -0.6% in 1980-
90 and 1990-2000) and statistically insignificant.  Housing value changes (plotted in the right 
                                                 
35 Census housing value data have been used to measure the market valuation of locational amenities (e.g., Chay and 
Greenstone, 2005; Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2006) and the effect of inter-city variation in supply restrictions 
(Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks, 2005). Values are self-reported, and frequently incorporate long lags (Bayer, Ferreira, 
and MacMillan, 2003).  This may make it difficult to observe sharp changes when a neighborhood tips.  
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hand column) show a negative relationship with δic,t−10 in 1970-80 and 1990-2000 periods, but 
not between 1980 and 1990.  Again, there is modest evidence for a discontinuous reaction at the 
tipping point.  The estimated discontinuities in values are -3.6% in 1970-80, -0.4% in 1980-90, 
and -2.2% in 1990-2000.  The first and last of these are significantly different from zero, though 
the former is not robust to the inclusion of additional controls.  
Theoretical predictions for the effect of demand shifts on home values depend 
importantly on the elasticity of local supply.  A decline in total (white plus minority) demand 
will lower prices if supply is inelastic, but will only reduce quantities if supply is perfectly 
elastic.  We estimated separate models for the change in housing values over the 1990s for the 
subset of highly developed tracts (as in row 2 of Table 4) and those with remaining room to 
build.  As expected, the estimated discontinuity in home values is larger in the former group of 
tracts.  It is also less precisely estimated, however, and is insignificantly different from zero. 
Overall, we conclude that the housing price reactions to tipping behavior are relatively 
modest.  This is consistent with the findings from a long literature (mainly in sociology) that 
studied the effects of the initial entry of minorities to previously all-white Census tracts.
36   Most 
of the housing market response to tipping is in the quantity domain: neighborhoods that tip grow 
more slowly than other tracts in the same city.  This may be consistent with a highly elastic 
supply of new housing units, coupled with a fear among builders that neighborhoods that have 
tipped will experience long run housing declines.
37 While we find a larger reaction of housing 
prices in highly developed areas where supply responses are constrained, the magnitude of the 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Myrdal (1944), Rapkin and Grigsby (1960), and Laurenti (1960).  Boston, Rigsby and Zald (1972) 
review the literature on this question up to the early 1970s.  
37 Another possibility is that the housing market anticipates tipping, and that its effect on prices is fully realized even 
before the base year (that is, that prices fall between 1960 and 1970 for neighborhoods that tip between 1970 and 
1980).  Estimated price changes in the decade before tipping are negative, but are as imprecise as those in Figure 6.  
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effect remains modest and is relatively imprecisely estimated.  
 
VI. Schools 
  One explanation for the importance of neighborhood racial composition is that families 
are concerned about the racial composition of schools.
38  An advantage of a schools-based 
analysis is that the peer group is clearly defined, so there are less likely to be spillovers among 
nearby schools. Table 8 reports estimates of specifications similar to those in the top row of 
Table 4, focusing on changes in the racial composition of elementary schools between 1990 and 
2000.  As in our neighborhood analysis, we use 2/3 of the schools in each MSA to search for a 
candidate tipping point (using the ￿fixed point￿ method) and the remaining 1/3 of schools to 
study dynamic behavior around these points.
39  The correlation between school and 
neighborhood-level tipping points for the same MSA is 0.4. 
Enrollment dynamics at elementary schools are remarkably similar to dynamics in 
neighborhoods.  White enrollment growth drops off substantially in schools that are just beyond 
the tipping point.  The magnitude of the discontinuity (-7.4) is very close to the magnitude 
observed in neighborhoods over the same period (-7.3).  As in the neighborhood analysis, 
relatively little of the outflow of white students is offset by inflows of minority students.  
Instead, schools that tip exhibit a discontinuous drop in enrollment growth.  Overall, the 
similarity of the dynamic behavior of schools and neighborhoods suggests that similar forces are 
driving the two processes.  
                                                 
38 There is a substantial literature on white flight from high-minority school districts, including Coleman Kelly and 
Moore (1975), Clotfelter (1979, 2001), Farley, Richards, and Wurdoch (1980), and Reber (2005). 
39 The school data are drawn from the Common Core.  Our sample includes 5,641 schools (in 72 MSA￿s) that can be 
matched between 1990 and 2000.  See the Data Appendix for more information.  
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VII.  Attitudes of Whites and the Location of the Tipping Point 
  The results from our analyses of neighborhoods and schools suggest that white mobility 
rates change discontinuously once the fraction of minorities exceeds a critical threshold.    The 
model presented in Section II suggests that the location of the tipping point will be higher in 
cities with more racially tolerant whites.  (Predictions for the speed of transition once tipping 
occurs are unclear ￿ this should depend primarily on the stickiness of the housing market.)  Our 
final analysis focuses on testing this insight, using information on the attitudes of white residents 
constructed from responses to the General Social Survey (GSS).
40   
  The annual GSS samples are small, and the survey instrument changes substantially from 
year to year.  To develop a reasonably reliable index of white attitudes, we pool GSS data from 
1975 to 1998 and select white respondents who can be assigned to MSAs.
41  We use four 
questions that elicit direct information about attitudes regarding contact between races (e.g. 
about views on antimiscegenation or housing discrimination laws).  We form from each question 
a city-level index, standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  The MSA effects are 
reasonably highly correlated across questions, and we form a composite index by taking a simple 
average of the indexes for the four underlying questions.
42  The composite index has standard 
                                                 
40 We follow here Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999), who use the GSS attitudes data for a similar investigation of 
cross-city variation in residential segregation.  It is important to note that causation￿in both their analysis and our 
own￿could run in either direction:  Intolerant whites could lead to lower tipping points (and higher segregation), 
but a lower tipping point could similarly lead to more segregation, less inter-racial contact, and less tolerant 
attitudes.  
41 The mapping to MSAs is necessarily approximate; in many cases only a subset of an MSA is in the GSS sample.  
Because PMSAs are inconsistently identified, we assign all GSS respondents to the CMSA and assign a single index 
value to all of the constituent PMSAs.  Our analyses with the GSS data are clustered on the CMSA. 
42 Details of the index construction are in the Data Appendix.  City-specific values are available on request.  We also 
explored using the principal component of the four sets of MSA effects.  This puts approximately equal weight on 
each factor, and yields similar results.   
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deviation 0.62. 
We are able to construct a value of the index for 81 cities in our tipping sample, with 100 
to 175 responses per city on each question.    The cities in our sample with the highest index 
values (indicating more strongly held views against racial contact) are Memphis (1.44) and 
Birmingham (1.31).  San Diego (-1.06) and Rochester (-1.05) have the lowest values. 
  Table 9 reports a series of models that take the tipping point (m
*
c,t-10) as the dependent 
variable.
43  We pool the 1970, 1980, and 1990 points together in one sample, and include dummy 
variables for each period.  For reference, the first column shows the mean and standard deviation 
of each of the independent variables.  Unless otherwise noted, the independent variables 
correspond to the base year.  Standard errors for the regressions are clustered on the CMSA.   
Our first specification includes the attitudes index, four region dummies, the black and 
Hispanic shares in the city, the density of the average resident￿s census tract, and the log of the 
city￿s population.  The racial share variables have coefficients of 0.53 and 0.65, suggesting that 
tipping points are higher ￿ but less than proportionately so ￿ in cities with higher minority 
shares.  Density is negatively related with the location of the tipping point, which accords with 
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor￿s (1999) finding of a positive relationship between density and 
segregation.  The attitudes index also has a significant negative coefficient, indicating, as 
predicted, that tipping points are lower in areas where whites are more intolerant.  The 
coefficients on the indicators for observations from 1980 and 1990 are both negative, indicating 
that the rise in the mean tipping point over time seen in Table 2 is more than accounted for by 
changes in the simple demographic variables included here, primarily growth in minority 
                                                 
43 For greater precision, we use estimated tipping points obtained from the full sample of tracts in each city.  
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populations. 
Research by Bayer, Fang, and McMillan (2005) suggests that income differences are an 
important determinant of segregation.  Column 3 adds the log mean incomes of blacks, 
Hispanics, and whites in the city.  Higher white incomes are associated with lower tipping 
points, and higher black and Hispanic incomes with higher tipping points.  The magnitudes are 
comparable, suggesting that an increase in income that is distributed evenly across races has 
little effect.  The inclusion of income controls slightly strengthens the attitude effect. 
Column 4 adds four additional variables.  The first is the rate of new housing 
construction in the city over the decade.  Given our earlier results that tipping is importantly 
related with neighborhood growth, the tipping point may differ between growing and shrinking 
cities.  The next three variables attempt to capture differences in the perceived safety of 
integrated neighborhoods.  One is an index of the cumulative severity of riots experienced in the 
city during the late 1960s (Collins and Margo, 2004).
44  The other variables measure the crime 
rate: the number of murders per 100,000 residents and the number of all other ￿index crimes￿ per 
capita.  When included in our basic specification (Column 4), the riots measure has the expected 
negative effect and is significant.  The murder rate also has a significant negative effect, while 
other crimes do not.  The attitudes index effect is largely unaffected by the additional controls.  
  To understand the magnitude of the attitudes index coefficients, consider the difference 
between a city in which whites have strong views against inter-racial contact (e.g. Memphis) and 
one where whites are relatively tolerant (e.g., San Diego).  The difference in the attitudes index 
between these cities is 2.5.  A coefficient of -3 implies that the tipping point about 7.5 percentage 
                                                 
44 We are grateful to Gregg Carter (1986) and Bill Collins for compiling and providing the data used for the 
construction of this index, which is drawn from Collins and Margo (2004).    
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points higher in San Diego than to Memphis, other factors equal.  Compared to a mean tipping 
point (over three decades) of 13.3 and a standard deviation of 9.6, this is a reasonably large 
effect.  The same -3 coefficient means that a standard deviation change in the value of the 
attitudes index produces a 1.8 percentage point rise in the tipping point, or a 0.14 ￿effect size.￿  
This result confirms the important link between tipping and white preferences.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
One explanation for the prevalence and persistence of racial segregation is that white 
families are unwilling to live in neighborhoods with high minority shares.  Such preferences can 
give rise to a ￿tipping point,￿ beyond which neighborhoods experience rapid outflows of whites. 
 Tipping derives from social interactions among the location decisions of individual families, and 
can arise even when preferences are smooth (Brock and Durlauf, 2001a).  Modern regression 
discontinuity techniques are well suited for detecting tipping behavior.  Applying these methods, 
we find strong evidence of tipping in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.   
An earlier literature in sociology examined the evolution of neighborhood racial shares 
under the rubric of ￿neighborhood succession.￿  Work by, e.g., Duncan and Duncan (1957) and 
Tauber and Tauber (1965) documented that in the 1940s and 1950s, neighborhoods with more 
than a handful of black residents experienced large white outflows and transitioned rapidly to 
high minority shares.  This can be seen as tipping with a very low tipping point.  Other work 
pointed out that property values would not necessarily collapse when a neighborhood tips:  
Myrdal (1944, p. 623) for example, argued that transitioning neighborhoods would see only 
temporary price declines, and an variety of empirical studies (surveyed in Boston et al., 1972)  
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found little evidence that racial succession reduced prices. 
Our results indicate important differences, but also similarities, in recent decades.  
Tipping is less dramatic than in mid-century but remains important.  Integrated neighborhoods 
with non-trivial minority shares can be stable, but if the minority share in these neighborhoods 
exceeds a critical threshold, they tip.  Most tipping in recent decades has occurred in the suburbs, 
in neighborhoods far from existing concentrations of minority population.  Several pieces of 
evidence ￿ particularly a robust correlation between survey-based estimates of white attitudes 
about integration and the location of the tipping point ￿ support the inference that tipping is 
driven by white families￿ preferences over the racial composition of their neighbors. 
In contrast to older studies, more recent data suggest that only a small fraction of the 
white flight from tipping neighborhoods is offset by minority inflows.  Rather, tipping is 
associated with substantial declines in neighborhood growth rates.  As in older work, however, 
we find little effect of tipping on rental prices or home values.  
Our analysis provides some of the first direct evidence of the highly nonlinear dynamic 
behavior predicted by many models of social interactions.  We find that such behavior is an 
important feature of neighborhood dynamics.  These complex dynamics are unlikely to arise in 
the absence of social interactions, lending further support for the view that residential 
segregation is driven at least in part by preferences of white families over the (endogenous) 
racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods.    
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  Data 
Most of our data are taken from tract-level tabulations of decennial Census data, mapped 
to the boundaries of year-2000 tracts and reported in the Neighborhood Change Database 
(NCDB).  We assign each tract to the 1999 MSA in which it lies.  Our sample for each decade 
excludes tracts meeting any of the following criteria: 
-  The decadal population growth rate exceeds the MSA mean by more than five standard 
deviations 
-  The ten-year growth in the white population exceeds 500% of the base-year total 
population.  
-  The MSA contains fewer than 100 tracts (after applying the previous criteria). 
We divide the remaining sample in each city into two random subsamples, one containing 2/3 of 
the tracts and the other containing 1/3. 
Throughout the paper, the ￿white￿ population consists of white, non-Hispanics.  All other 
residents are ￿minorities￿ (except in Table 4, where we consider other definitions).  Because the 
1970 data do not separately identify white and non-white Hispanics, we impute the white non-
Hispanic share.  We use 1980 data to estimate a regression of the white, non-Hispanic share in a 
tract on the black share, white share, and Hispanic share.  We use the coefficient estimates from 
this regression and the black, white, and Hispanic shares in 1970 to predict the 1970 white non-
Hispanic share in the tract, censoring predicted values at 0 and 1.  When we compute changes in 
the non-Hispanic white population between 1970 and 1980, we use imputed values in both years. 
 For our analysis of alternative tipping points Table 4, we use a similar imputation procedure to 
identify the number of non-Hispanic blacks in each tract in 1970.       
We use the procedures identified in the text to identify candidate tipping points in the 2/3 
subsample.  We use a two-step procedure to identify the roots of E[Dwic,t | c, mic,t−10] - E[Dwic,t | 
c] for the ￿fixed point￿ procedure.  We first fit Dwic,t - E[Dwic,t | c] to a quartic polynomial in 
mic,t−10, using only tracts with minority shares below 60%.  We identify a root of this polynomial, 
excluding those above 50% minority share and, in cases where there are multiple roots, selecting 
the one at which the polynomial has the most negative slope.  We then fit a second quartic 
polynomial, using only tracts with mic,t-10 within ten percentage points of this root, and select a 
root of this second polynomial as our candidate point.  There are a few cities where these 
polynomials have no roots; in these cases, we do not identify a tipping point.   
Once candidate tipping points are identified, we discard the 2/3 sample used to identify 
them and use the 1/3 sample for all further analyses.  
The tract-level covariates used in Tables 3-7 are also drawn from the NCDB, using data 
from the base year (i.e. 1970 for the 1970-1980 analysis).  These are: 
-  The proportion of persons 16+ years old who are in the civilian labor force and 
unemployed. 
-  Natural logarithm of mean family income.   
-  The fraction of workers who use public transport to travel to work (aged 16+ in 1980 and 
1990; 14+ in 1970). 
-  The fraction of homes in a tract that are vacant, renter-occupied, and single-unit.  
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Land-use data 
  In Table 4, we distinguish between tracts in which more or less than 91% of the 
developable land is developed.  We use the National Land Cover Database, created by the 
USGS.  These data are derived from satellite photographs taken in 1992, machine-coded to 
describe land use.  We use a version of the data that reports the fraction of each census tract 
devoted to each of 21 uses (e.g., water, low-intensity residential, row crops, deciduous forest).  
This was created by Albert Saiz and Susan Wachter, and we are grateful to them for making it 
available to us.  We exclude several categories (water, perennial ice/snow, bare rock, quarries) as 
undevelopable, and compute the fraction of the remainder that is devoted to residential or 
commercial/industrial/transport uses.  
Schools 
Our analysis of schools parallels that of neighborhoods, but relies on the Common Core 
of Data (CCD) to measure public elementary schools￿ racial compositions in 1990 and 2000.  
The only available control variable is the fraction of students qualifying for free school lunches.  
This is missing for many schools in 1990; we impute values from 1995 or 2000 where necessary. 
Metropolitan-level variables 
  In Table 9, we examine the correlates of the metropolitan-level tipping point.  The 
demographic variables used here￿the racial composition, population, and income variables, as 
well as the housing development measure, are drawn from summary tape files of the 1970, 1980, 
and 1990 Censuses.  We use county-level records (towns in New England), matched to 1999 
MSA boundaries and then aggregated to the MSA level.  We were unable to match the 1970 
town records to the current town codes, so the New England observations are constructed as 
averages of the counties that overlap each MSA, weighted by the fraction of the county 
population in the MSA.  
  The density measure used in Table 9 is constructed from the NCDB tract-level data.  We 
compute the population density of each tract in the base year, then compute a metropolitan-level 
average weighting tracts by their populations. 
  The crime variables were computed from Uniform Crime Reports data for 1970, 1980, 
and 1990, obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR).  In 1980 and 1990, the underlying data are at the county level.  In 1970, the underlying 
data are at the agency level.  We used the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk 
(2005), also from ICPSR, to aggregate to the county-level.  We then aggregate county-level data 
to the level of the MSA, weighting New England counties by the fraction of their population in 
each relevant MSA.  
  The riots index is constructed from data from Carter (1986), following the definition 
proposed by Collins and Margo (2004).  For each riot, we compute  ( ) ∑ =
i iT ji j X X S , where 
ji X  is a component of severity (deaths, injuries, arsons, and days of rioting) and  iT X  is the sum 
of components  ji X  across all riots.  We created a crosswalk between the cities reported in the 
Carter data and our MSAs.  We add across the severity measure for all riots within each MSA to 
form the MSA-level index.   
  The final metropolitan-level variable is the racial attitudes index.  We use four questions  
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from the General Social Survey:  
I:   Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites?   
II:  In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black and white school children from one 
school district to another?   
III: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the statement: ￿White people have a right to 
keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should respect that right￿?  
IV: Suppose there is a community wide vote on the general housing issue.  Which (of the 
following two) laws would you vote for: 
A.  One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if 
he prefers not to sell to blacks. 
B.  The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their 
race or color. 
For each question, we compute an indicator for an intolerant response.  We estimate a linear 
probability model for each indicator, using only white GSS respondents who can be assigned to 
an MSA or CMSA.  The models include MSA/CMSA fixed effects and controls for gender, age, 
education, a socioeconomic status index, and survey year dummies.  We extract the MSA effects 
and standardize each set to have mean zero and standard deviation one.  Our attitudes index is 
the simple average of these standardized MSA effects. 
  The dependent variable in Table 9 is the MSA/PMSA-level candidate tipping point, from 
the fixed point procedure.  In this table, we use points identified from the full sample of tracts in 
each MSA rather than the 2/3 sample used elsewhere. 
 
Appendix B:  Falsification Exercise 
Our estimation procedure is not part of the econometrician￿s standard toolbox, and the 
possibility exists that it might be biased toward finding evidence of a discontinuous tipping 
effect even if the true relationship between the base-year minority share and the change in the 
white population over ten years is smooth.  To assess the size of our test, we estimated our model 
using simulated data with a smooth data generating process.  Specifically, using the observed 
distribution of tract minority shares in two cities, we generated simulated data using two DGPs.  
The first assumes that E[Dwt | mt-10] matches the estimates we obtain by fitting the following 
model to the true data: 
 
(B1) Dwt = α + mt-10 β1 + mt-10
2 β2 + mt-10
3 β3 + mt-10
4 β4 + 1(mt-10 > m
*) γ + εt. 
 
Our second DGP assumes that 
 
(B2) Dwt  = α + mt-10 β1 + mt-10
2 β2 + mt-10
3 β3 + mt-10
4 β4 + εt. 
 
We again obtain the coefficients by fitting this model to the true data, not allowing a 
discontinuity.  This yields a polynomial that is much steeper than that indicated by equation 
(B1).    
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For each tract, we draw εt from a normal distribution with variance equal to the observed 
residual variance, then add it to the fitted values from (B1) or (B2).  We then apply our 
estimation procedure to this simulated sample, first dividing it into subsamples, identifying the 
tipping point from one subsample, and finally estimating model (B1) using the other subsample. 
We use two cities as the basis for these simulations.  In Appendix Figure 1, the DGPs are 
estimated using data from Chicago in 1970-1980, and each of the simulation samples is the same 
size and has the same 1970 minority share distribution as the Chicago data.  In Appendix Figure 
2, we use a smaller city, Portland, Oregon, in 1970-1980.  In each Figure, the solid line shows 
the distribution when the DGP is (B1), while the dashed line shows the distribution for DGP 
(B2).  The solid vertical line in each figure shows the threshold for rejection of the hypothesis 
that the true effect equals zero, using a 5% one-sided test and the mean standard error across 
simulation draws.    
In Appendix Figure 1, the bulk of the estimates from the first DGP are to the left of the 
average rejection threshold, while nearly all of those from the second are to the right.  We reject 
the null hypothesis of no effect (using a 1-sided 5% test) in 6.0% of the simulations from the 
second DGP and in 90.2% of those from the first.  The figure thus indicates that the size of our 
test is 6% when the true DGP is a continuous 4
th-order polynomial, and that we have 90% power 
against the null hypothesis when the sample size and discontinuity are as large as in Chicago. 
Appendix Figure 2 repeats the exercise using Portland data.  We again see that DGP 1 
yields consistently lower estimates than DGP 2, though because the sample size is much smaller 
both sets of estimates are more widely dispersed than in Figure A1 and they overlap 
substantially.  This simulation indicates that the size of our test is 6.6%, but because the Portland 
sample size (387 tracts) is much smaller than that in Chicago (1,803 tracts), we reject the null 
hypothesis of no discontinuity in Portland in only 26.4% of the replications. 
 
Appendix C:  Bootstrap Standard Errors 
  A second concern with the estimates in the main text is that our standard errors do not 
take account of the fact that m
* is estimated.  The change point literature (e.g., Bai 1997) 
indicates that if there is in fact a change point, m
* is super-consistent and that variance estimators 
that treat it as known are consistent.  However, because some of the cities in our sample may not 
have a change point, this result may not hold in our application.   
  Appendix Table 1 presents several alternative estimates of the standard errors for the 
estimates in Column 1 of Table 3.  The first two rows repeat the estimates and standard errors 
from Table 3.  Row 3 presents classical standard errors that treat the data as independent and 
homoskedastic.  These are somewhat smaller than those in Table 3.  Row 4 presents 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors that maintain the independence assumption.  These are 
nearly identical to those in row 3. 
  The remaining rows present standard errors from the (nonparametric) bootstrap.  
Implementing the bootstrap is somewhat complex￿an individual bootstrap ignores the possible 
clustering, while a block bootstrap allows for non-independence within MSAs but cannot 
account for sampling variation in the estimated m
* for each city.  We take three approaches.  The 
first approach ignores the clustering of the data and draws bootstrap samples (with replacement)  
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from the full sample, independent of city.  The second is a block bootstrap, drawing a sample of 
the same number of cities as in our original sample.  (The number of tracts in the bootstrap 
samples varies somewhat here, as in some draws larger cities are overrepresented and in other 
draws the smaller cities are.) 
  The final bootstrap approach is the most sophisticated.  We first stratify cities into three 
groups:  Those with fewer than 225 tracts in the sample, those with 225-999 tracts, and those 
with 1000 or more tracts.  We perform a block bootstrap, stratifying on the city strata.  This 
ensures a sample of the same number of cities with approximately the same size distribution as 
in our original sample.  For each city in the bootstrap sample ￿ treating multiple draws of the 
same original city as distinct ￿ we draw with replacement from the tracts in that city to obtain a 
sample matching the original size.  This block-and-individual bootstrap allows for both sampling 
variation in city-level statistics and non-independence of observations within cities. 
  For each bootstrap strategy, on each draw we repeat our full estimation procedure.  We 
randomly divide each city (or, in the case of the block bootstraps, city replicate) into subsamples, 
and use a 2/3 sample to select candidate tipping points.  We then use the remaining 1/3 
subsample to estimate the coefficients of our model.  Rows 5-7 of Appendix Table 1 present 
average point estimates across 200 replications for each of the three bootstrap strategies.  Those 
in rows 5 and 6 are comparable to those in Table 3.  Those in row 7 are slightly larger than our 
clustered standard errors, but not enough so to change any of our qualitative conclusions.  
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Percent minority (Hispanic or non-white) in tract in 1970
 
Notes:  Dots show mean of the change in the tract-level non-Hispanic white population between 1970 and 
1980 as a percentage of the total tract population in 1970, grouping tracts into cells of width 1% by the 
1970 minority (Hispanic and/or non-white) share.  The horizontal line depicts the unconditional mean.   
Also shown is a local linear regression fit to the tract-level data, using an Epanechnikov kernel and a 
bandwidth of 3.5 and estimated separately on each side of 5.7%.  This point is chosen using a search 
procedure and a 2/3 sample of Chicago tracts.  Only the remaining 1/3 subsample is used for the series 
depicted here.  See text for details. Figure 2:  Three equilibria 
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Figure 3:  Rising minority demand leads to a tipping point 
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Pittsburgh, PA, 1980-1990
 
Note:  See notes to Figure 1.  Solid vertical line represents the point identified by the “fixed 
point” method and dashed for that selected by the “structural break” method.  Where only 
one line is shown, the two coincide.Figure 5:  Neighborhood change in a pooled sample of metropolitan tracts, by 
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1990-2000 -- Structural break method
 
Notes:  X axis is minority share in tract minus the estimated tipping point in the city.  Y axis is the change 
in the white population over 10 years, expressed as a percentage of the total base year population and 
deviated from the mean of this in the city.  Dots depict averages in 1-percentage-point bins.  Solid line is a 
local linear regression fit separately on either side of zero using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth 
of 5.  Dashed line is a global 4
th order polynomial with an intercept shift at zero.  All series use only the 1/3 
of tracts not used to identify the tipping points. Figure 6:  Change in log mean housing rents and values, by relationship to 
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1990-2000 -- Values
 
Notes:  X axis is minority share in tract minus the estimated tipping point in the city.  Y axis is the log 
change in mean rents or values over 10 years, computed over renter- and owner- occupied homes, 
respectively, and deviated from the mean of this logged change in the city.  Dots depict averages in 1-
percentage-point bins.  Solid line is a local linear regression fit separately on either side of zero.  Dashed 
line is a global 4
th order polynomial with an intercept shift at zero. Table 1: Summary statistics for metropolitan census tracts
1970 1980 1990
(1) (2) (3)
# of tracts in NCDB data (with pop>0) 46,334 51,857 64,891
# of tracts in MSAs 45,636 49,896 51,037
# of tracts in sample 35,725 39,283 40,187
# of MSAs in sample 104 113 114
Mean % minority, t-10 16.4 23.5 29.0
Growth in total population, t-10 to t (%) 31.0 24.0 16.6
Growth in white population, t-10 to t
as % of t-10 population 19.5 13.2 4.2
0-5% minority in base year:
# of tracts in sample 17,097 13,001 9,394
Growth in total population 31.3 19.4 16.2
Growth in white population 25.2 15.7 11.8
5-20% minority in base year:
# of tracts in sample 10,770 13,301 13,666
Growth in total population 45.6 36.8 22.8
Growth in white population 28.2 23.4 9.7
20-40% minority in base year:
# of tracts in sample 3,131 4,870 6,325
Growth in total population 30.5 30.2 19.8
Growth in white population 0.7 6.6 -3.5
40-100% minority in base year:
# of tracts in sample 4,727 8,111 10,802
Growth in total population -3.2 6.7 7.2
Growth in white population -8.5 -3.9 -5.0













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean 11.87 8.98 13.53 11.69 14.46 13.96
SD 9.51 8.78 10.19 8.23 9.00 9.68
# of MSAs in sample 104 104 113 113 114 114
# without identified points 4 -- 3 -- 0 --
Correlations
1970-1980, fixed point 1.00
1970-1980, structural break 0.55 1.00
1980-1990, fixed point 0.46 0.45 1.00
1980-1990, structural break 0.45 0.39 0.64 1.00
1990-2000, fixed point 0.50 0.44 0.59 0.68 1.00
1990-2000, structural break 0.45 0.61 0.58 0.73 0.73 1.00
1990-2000 1970-1980 1980-1990
Note:  Tipping points describe the minority share in the census tract, measured in percentage points.  Summary 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1970-1980
Beyond candidate tipping  -12.1 -10.4 -14.2 -16.4 2.0 -0.1 -10.1 -10.4
  point in 1970 (2.7) (3.4) (3.1) (4.3) (1.0) (1.2) (3.0) (3.5)
Demographic/housing controls y y n n y y y y
N 11,611 11,886 11,611 11,886 11,611 11,886
R
2 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24
1980-1990
Beyond candidate tipping  -13.6 -11.4 -17.0 -18.6 -1.1 0.3 -14.7 -11.1
  point in 1980 (2.0) (3.5) (3.1) (3.5) (1.1) (1.1) (2.6) (4.1)
N 12,151 13,067 12,151 13,067 12,151 13,067
R
2 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29
1990-2000
Beyond candidate tipping  -7.3 -9.3 -3.6 -6.6 2.9 1.4 -4.3 -7.9
  point in 1990 (1.5) (1.8) (2.1) (2.0) (1.1) (0.8) (2.1) (2.2)
N 13,371 13,371 13,371 13,371 13,371 13,371
R
2 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.13
Table 3:  Basic regression discontinuity models for population changes around the candidate tipping 
point
Notes:  The unit of observation is a tract in the indicated decade.  Dependent variables are the change in the 
relevant population (white in columns 1-4, minority in 5-6, or total in 7-8) as a percentage (0-100) of the tract's 
total base-year population.  Pooled specifications (columns 1-2 and 5-8) include MSA fixed effects, a quartic 
polynomial in the deviation in the tract’s minority share from the candidate tipping point, the unemployment 
rate, log(mean family income), housing vacancy rate, renter share, fraction of homes in single-unit buildings, 
and fraction of workers who commute using public transit, all measured in the base year at the tract-level.  
Standard errors are clustered on the MSA.  Fully interacted specifications (columns 3-4) report average tipping 
coefficients from city-by-city regressions with quartics in the tract minority share.  The coefficient on the 
"beyond tipping point" indicator is averaged across cities, weighing cities by their numbers of tracts.  Standard 
errors in these columns are robust to heteroskedasticity.  All specifications are estimated using only the 1/3 of 
tracts not used to identify the tipping points.
Change in white population Change in 
minority pop.
Change in total 
population
Fully interacted Pooled Pooled PooledTable 4:  Tipping in the 1990s, by amount of remaining undeveloped land
# of tracts Change in white 
population
Change in minority 
population




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 13,371 -7.3 2.9 -4.3 3.4
(1.5) (1.1) (2.1) (0.4)
>91% developed 3,368 -4.7 4.7 0.0 4.6
(1.1) (1.1) (1.3) (1.0)
<91% developed 9,875 -6.1 2.4 -3.7 2.5
(1.8) (1.3) (2.6) (0.4)
Note:  See notes to Table 3 (columns 1, 5, and 7) for details on sample and specifications.  Fixed point 
candidate tipping points are used.  Column 5 takes as the dependent variable the minority share in 2000 
minus the minority share in 1990, but is otherwise identical.  Developed land measure is computed from the 
National Land Cover Data; 91% is the 75th percentile of this measure.  See text for details.  
Tipping discontinuity, 1990-2000Table 5.  Tipping in minority share, black share, and black/Hispanic share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-12.1 -6.4 -13.6 -12.6 -7.3 -3.9
point (2.7) (3.1) (2.0) (2.1) (1.5) (1.4)
-22.0 -16.2 -10.3 -3.0 -11.7 -4.3
(2.5) (3.3) (2.9) (3.2) (1.8) (1.6)
-13.2 0.0 -11.0 0.0 -10.3 -3.2





Notes:  See Table 3 footnote for a description of demographic/housing controls.  Specifications in columns 1, 
5, and 7 are identical to those in Table 3, column 1.  Other columns explore candidate tipping points in the 
tract black share or combined black and Hispanic share.  In each case, the dependent variable is the change in 
the tract's non-Hispanic white population, expressed as a percentage of the base-year total population.  All 
specifications include MSA fixed effects, and are estimated using only the 1/3 of tracts not used to identify the 
tipping points.  Standard errors are clustered on the MSA. 
Beyond minority share fixed 
Beyond black/Hispanic share 
Beyond black share fixed point 
Quartic in bl/hi share minus TP
Demographic/housing controls
Quartic in min. share minus TP
Quartic in black share minus 
1990-2000 1980-1990 1970-1980Table 6.  Sensitivity to flexible controls for neighborhood demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1970-1980 -12.1 -12.2 -12.2 -12.7 -11.3 -12.7 -12.1
(2.7) (2.7) (2.7) (2.7) (2.6) (2.7) (2.6)
4th order polynomial in:
Unemployment rate y y
log(mean family income) y y
Vacancy rate y y
Renter share y y
Fraction single-unit buildings y y
1980-1990 -13.6 -13.3 -13.3 -13.6 -12.6 -13.6 -11.8
(2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0)
1990-2000 -7.3 -7.0 -7.1 -7.5 -6.0 -6.9 -5.5
(1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5)
Notes:  Specification in column 1 is that from column 1 of Table 3.  Remaining specifications add quartic 



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
-10.7 -10.6 -4.9 -7.6 -4.7 -3.4 -0.6 -2.7 -3.4

















Notes:   Specifications are identical to those in Table 3, Column 1, but are fully interacted with the indicated 
tract characteristics.  Reported here are the beyond-tipping-point main effects, interaction coefficients, and the 
net effect of being beyond the tipping point for tracts in each category.  The nearest high-minority-tract is the 
closest tract (measuring distances between tract centroids) with a minority share above 60%.  "Neighbors" in 
columns 7-9 are the five closest tracts within five miles.
Total tipping effect when distance is 
2-5 miles
Interaction:  Beyond TP x none of 
neighbors have m>m*
Total tipping effect when none of 
neighbors have m>m*
By central city / 
remainder of MSA
By indicator for 
having a neighbor 
with m>m*
By distance to 
nearest high-
minority share 
Total tipping effect when distance is 
>5 miles
Interaction:  Beyond TP x outside of 
central city
Total tipping effect when outside of 
central city
Main effect:  Beyond tipping point
Interaction:  Beyond TP x nearest high-
minority-share tract is 2-5 miles away
Interaction:  Beyond TP x nearest high-
minority-share tract is >5 miles awayTable 8:  Tipping in elementary schools
Change in white 
population
Change in minority 
population




(2) (3) (4) (5)
Beyond candidate -7.4 0.9 -6.5 2.3
tipping point (2.3) (0.9) (2.3) (0.8)
N 5,641 5,641 5,641 5,641
Note:  Sample consists of elementary schools in the MSA.  Tipping points are estimated using the fixed 
point method over a 2/3 subsample; the remaining 1/3 subsample is used to estimate the specifications 
shown here.  Each includes a quartic polynomial in the minority share relative to the candidate tipping 
point, MSA fixed effects, and a control for the school free lunch share.  Standard errors are clustered on the 
MSA.
Tipping discontinuity, 1990-2000Table 9.  Models for the location of the tipping point
Mean
[SD]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Race attitudes index -0.1 -2.77 -2.98 -2.66
  (positive = less tolerant) [0.6] (1.16) (1.08) (0.94)
% Black 11.4 0.53 0.59 0.81
[8.6] (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
% Hispanic 6.7 0.65 0.75 0.94
[9.9] (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Population density (10,000s/sq mile) 0.50 -1.81 -1.80 -1.42
[0.60] (0.45) (0.39) (0.39)
Log (MSA population) 13.7 -0.89 -1.15 0.70
[0.8] (0.60) (0.63) (0.69)
Log(per capita income), whites 9.0 -11.77 -9.34
[0.7] (5.38) (3.99)
Log(per capita income), blacks 8.5 9.26 6.83
[0.8] (5.62) (4.68)
Log(per capita income), Hispanics 8.6 7.08 7.17
[0.8] (2.92) (2.34)
Fraction of houses built in last decade 0.26 1.90
[0.11] (6.26)
Cumulative riots index 0.04 -14.33
[0.09] (6.57)
Murders per 100,000 population 8.9 -0.50
[5.5] (0.18)
Other index crimes per 100 population 5.9 -0.59
[1.9] (0.36)
1980 -0.97 -4.66 -2.96
(1.26) (3.45) (2.68)
1990 -0.98 -10.40 -9.69
(1.02) (6.54) (5.04)
N 234 234 234
R2 0.52 0.54 0.60
Notes:  Unit of observation is an MSA/PMSA-decade (1970, 1980, and 1990).  All 
specifications include three Census region dummies.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
MSA/CMSA level.  Tipping points are estimated from the full sample of tracts in each city.  
Explanatory variables correspond to the base year and MSA/PMSA, unless otherwise noted.  
The race attitudes index is derived from responses to the General Social Survey, and is 
constant for the entire CMSA over all years.  The cumulative riots index is derived from the 
riot severity dataset from Carter (1986) and is constant for the MSA/PMSA over all years.  
Murder and other index crime rates are derived from the Uniform Crime Reports.  See 
appendix for details on the construction of the variables.  Appendix Figure 1:  Simulation of tipping estimates when true data generating 
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 Appendix Table 1:  Bootstrap vs. regular SEs 
 
1970s 1980s 1990s
(1) Coefficient estimate -12.15 -13.63 -7.26
(2) SE: Cluster 2.73 2.02 1.53
(3) SE: Classical 2.21 1.63 1.22
(4) SE: Robust 2.15 1.67 1.23
(5) SE: Bootstrap 2.27 1.49 1.09
(6) SE: Block  bootstrap 2.51 2.22 1.52
(7) SE:  Block and individual bootstrap 2.99 2.29 1.72
Notes:  Point estimates in row 1 and standard errors in row 2 are from Column 1 of 
Table 3.  Remaining rows report standard errors from various alternative estimators.
 
 
 
 